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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
It is unfortunate that legislation so beneficial as workmen's
compensation should have had to be introduced through the devious
and dubious plan of an unfree election. A theoretical inconsistency
will remain between that plan and the principle that constitutional
guaranties must not be evaded by conditional licenses and privileges,
even though the application of the principle to that plan is not
likely to be pressed. It is to be hoped that the principle itself,
already recognized in connection with the conditions that may or
may not be imposed upon foreign corporations doing business in
a state, will now become firmly established and vigorously applied.
The protection of property rights from excessive exactions or
novel limitations presents in the last analysis a problem of policy
and power, but the methods by which the legislature accomplishes
its purposes are of the essence of due process. Neither the imposi-
tion of liability without fault, nor the compulsory transformation of
a private into a common carrier, is necessarily inconsistent with an
orderly system of law, but there is something repugnant to law and
order in.the accomplishment of these purposes by a legislative trick.
The psychology of legislation is indeed such that indirect compulsion
is submitted to where direct compulsion would be resisted or would
be politically unavilable; and indirect methods may be acquiesced
in where government has to be carried on under a rigid constitution.
A consistent application of the principle need therefore not be looked
forward to. But it is well that notice has now been served that the
conditional license or privilege is not a reliable instrument for
circumventing constitutional limitations.
ERNST FREUND.'
REAL PROPERTY-DETERMINABLE FEE.-[Indiana App.] A
brought a suit to quiet title to an undivided one-third of certain
real estate subject to the life estate of B. The complaint alleged
that the appellant's father, C, was the owner in fee simple of the
real estate and conveyed the same to B, his wife; that the words
of the instrument were: "conveys and warrants to B, his wife,
for the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), the following
described real estate-and for a further consideration that at the
death of B, that the above described land shall revert back to C";
that C later died leaving appellant and one other child and his
widow as his sole heirs, and by reason of the death of C, the
appellant became the owner of an undivided one-third of the lands,
subject to the life estate of B. B demurred to the complaint and
the demurrer was sustained. Held: that the deed created a base
fee and C having died before B, B held the land in fee simple.'
In Indiana a husband may convey direct to his wife if the
conveyance is made in good faith and for a valuable consideration. 2
The common law recognized a determinable or base fee but
it was necessary before 'such a fee was created that the event
1. McGahan v. McGahan 151 N. E. (Ind. App.) 627.
2. Merchants and Laborers Building Association v. Scanlan et al. 144
Ind. 11.
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named as terminating the estate be such that it may by possibility
never happen at all, as it is an essential characteristic of a fee that
it may possibly endure forever.3 There are some decisions to the
effect that since the Statute of Quia Emptores there can be no
such estate created ;4 but determinable fees are recognized in Indiana.5
Apparently the widow contended that in any event the deed
was absolute for the reason that the estate granted in the premises
could not be limited by the later clause in the deed. The court,
however, follows the general rule to the effect that the grant being
general, it was subject to limitation in the habendum clause, and
then the court says:
"This brings us to a study of such clause which, as it seems to us,
may better be termed a conditional limitation of the fee conveyed by
the granting clause. It is to be observed that by this provision at the
death of the grantee, the estate created was to revert to the grantor. There
is no provision for a reversion of (sic) anyone other than the grantor.
The provision is not to the grantor or his heirs, but at the time of the
death of the grantee, the grantor had died and there was no one to
whom the estate could revert. A fair interpretation of the clause and
its effect upon the granting clause is that it created what in common
law was called a 'base fee'-a fee which was to determine upon the
happening of a certain event. In this case the death of the grantee
before the grantor, and when it becomes impossible that such event
shall happen, the estate becomes a fee simple without limitation. With
this construction of the so-called habendum clause, upon the death of
Simeon McGahan, his wife became the owner of the real estate involved
without limitation."
The court apparently interprets the limitation to read as follows:
"In the event of the death of B before the death of C, then B's
estate in fee is to terminate and the property is to revert to C."
It is submitted, however, that upon the face of the instrument and
without any evidence explaining the intention of the parties, a life
estate merely and not a determinable fee was created. The con-
dition is that at the death of B the property shall revert to the
grantor. Of course, that limitation can in nowise create a deter-
minable fee for the reason that the death of B is an event which is
certain to happen. The fact that the clause does not provide for
a reversion in the event of the death of the grantor would seem to
have no argumentative force for the reason that the law supplies
the omission and the reversion or the possibility of reversion would
pass to the heirs of the grantor. 6 The argument of the court then
to the effect that, because the reversion was to the grantor and
not to the grantor and his heirs, therefore, the reversion was limited
to the grantor himself, is without substance.
A deed is construed in much the same manner as a written
contract and the primary rule to be observed is that the real inten-
3. Tiffany "Real Property" (2nd ed.) Vol. 1, sec. 93.
4. Tiffany op. cit. (2nd ed.) sec. 93, p. 336.
5. Alfred v. Sylvester 184 Ind. 542, 111 N. E. 914.
6. Tiffany op. cit. (2nd ed.) Vol. 1, p. 474.
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ion of the parties is to be sought and carried out whenever pos-
sible.
7
If the language of the instrument is unambiguous, the intention
must be ascertained from the language itself,8 but if the language
of the instrument is vague and general or is ambiguous, evidence
is admissible to show the actual intention of the parties. 9 In the
absence of any such explanation, the instrument is to be construed
most favorably to the grantee.10
Ordinarily a gift in general terms to A followed by a gift to
another "at" or "upon!' A's death creates merely a life estate in
A."
It is submitted that under the general rules of construction
of a deed, the deed in the instant case created merely a life estate
in the grantee with a remainder in fee to the grantor and that in
any event the decision of the court reads into the instrument a
condition which is not actually there and which could only be read
in upon competent evidence as to the intention of the parties on
the ground that the language of the deed itself was ambiguous and
uncertain. BERNARD C. GAVIT.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE.-[Federal] The doubtful wis-
dom, from the economic viewpoint, of holding that a seller's efforts
to control the resale price of his product are always harmful and
should not be permitted to succeed, is interestingly illustrated in
a recent case which raises the question in a somewhat unusual
manner.' The American Tobacco Company (hereafter called the
defendant), as well as other manufacturers of tobacco products,
sold its goods to jobbers at 90% of a certain schedule of prices
called "list" prices. It suggested that its customers should sell to
retailers only on the basis of these, list prices. This suggestion was
frequently disregarded by jobbers, to the mutual dissatisfaction of
competing jobbers who saw their margin of profit reduced or even
wiped out, and of the defendant which found its system of distribu-
tion disorganized. As a result in various cities where the extremest
price-cutting conditions prevailed the jobbers themselves took steps
to protect themselves by forming loose organizations, which all job-
bers were urged to join, which then fixed the proper prices at which
sales to retailers should be made. Members were urged to observe
these prices, and all violators, whether members or not, were sub-
jected to such pressure as the organization could bring to bear, to
7. Mittell v. Karl 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553, 8 L. R. A. 655; Wilson v.
Carrico 140 Ind. 533, 40 N. E. 50, 49 A. S. R. 213.
8. Fowler v. Black 136 Ill. 363, 26 N. E. 596, 11 L. L A. 670.
-9. Dixon v. Van Hoose 157 Ala. 459, 47 So. 718, 19 L. R. A. N. S. 719.
10. Davenport v. Gwilliats 133 Ind. 142.
11. Tiffany op. cit. (2nd ed.) Vol. 1, p. 79.
1. American Tobacco Company v. Federal Trade Commission (1925) 9
Fed. (2d) 570.
